St. John's Law Review
Volume 23, April 1949, Number 2

Article 14

Federal Crop Insurance--Federal Register as Effective Notice
(Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 23

relationship between the printed material and the drug. It matters
not that there is a time interval of weeks, months, or even years 9
between the shipment of the drug and the mailing of the literature.
There is a violation if the court finds the necessary "textual relationship," and this relationship, when found, constitutes "accompanying" within the meaning of the disputed section. As Mr. Justice
Douglas said: "One article or thing is accompanied by another when
it supplements or explains it, in the manner that a committee report
of the Congress accompanies a bill." 10
However, as suggested in the dissenting opinion (in which three
justices concurred), there is a need for congressional revision of the
phraseology of other sections of the Act, if the courts are to be spared
the necessity of further judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Guided by the intent of the law-makers the courts will continue to seek the protection of the unsuspecting consumers, but that
worthy purpose can be rendered easier of accomplishment by a timely
clarification of the statutes involved.
W.G.

FEDERAL CROP INSURANcE-FEDERAL REGISTER AS EFFECTIVE

NoTIcE.-Plaintiff, an Idaho farmer, procured crop insurance from
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation' after receiving the assurance of local agents of the corporation that the crop was insurable.
Thereafter, plaintiff's crops failed and he sought recovery under the
terms of the policy. The corporation opposed any recovery under
the policy on the ground that the plaintiff's crop was uninsurable.
Neither the plaintiff nor the agents knew that under the Wheat Crop
Insurance Regulations, which had been duly published in the Federal Register, the crop was actually uninsurable. 2 The Idaho state
court in which the plaintiff brought his action, invoking the doctrine
of equitable estoppel, allowed evidence to the effect that plaintiff was
not apprised of the regulations and had been misled by the representations of the corporation's agents into believing that the crop was
insurable. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court judgment for
plaintiff was affirmed.3 Held, reversed 5 to 4. Estoppel is not applicable here, for the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register is ".

.

. sufficient to give notice of such [rules and

1One count in the informations against Kordel alleged that the printed
matter was posted 561 days after the shipment of the drugs.
10 Kordel v. United States, 335 U. S. 345, 350, 93 L. ed. 73 (1948).
1 The Corporation, a government agency, was created in 1938 by the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 52 STAT. 72 (1938), 7 U. S. C. § 150 et seq. (1946),
for the purpose of insuring farmers' crops against loss due to drought and
other causes.
27 Code Fed. Regs. §414 (Supp. 1945), 10 Fed. Reg. 1585 (1945).
367 Idaho 196, 174 P. 2d 834 (1946).
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regulations] to any person subject thereto or affected thereby." 4
Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 92 L. ed. 51
(1947).
This case, today known as the "Idaho Farmer's Case," is in
accord with several decisions handed down since the creation of the
Federal Register in 1935. In Flannagan v. United States, it was
held that one selling beef after publication in the Federal Register
of regulations fixing the maximum price, was charged with knowledge
of the maximum priceY Publication in the Federal Register is notice
of the maximum rent allowed to be charged under the Emergency
Price Control Act.6 Where the Interstate Commerce Commission's
general order was published in the Federal Register, it was sufficient
notice to motor carriers of the authority of the Commission's agents
as created by the general order.7 In an action to recover brokerage
commissions for procuring a purchaser for buses, it was assumed that
plaintiff knew of the O.P.A. price regulations that were violated by
the agreed selling price of the buses.8 It has been stated that the
instant case was squarely decided on true legal principles.9 The
agency created by the Federal Crop Insurance Act was given the
power to "...
adopt, amend, and repeal by-laws, rules, and regulations . .
10 and, to the plaintiff, who sought to come within the
act "... the Regulations had the effect of law." 11 The principle
that ignorance of the law is no excuse seems irrefutably to support
the decision of the court. However, as is evidenced by the division
of the court, the decision in this case in view of the surrounding
circumstances, clearly presents a case of inequitable hardship. Mr.
Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, realistically refers to the
"... absurdity of holding that every farmer who insures his crop
knows what the Federal Register contains.... If he were to peruse
this voluminous and dull publication as it is issued from time to time,
4 Federal

Register Act, 49

STAT.

502 (1935), 44 U. S. C. § 307 (1946).

A second proposition, not treated here, upon which the Court denied recovery,

is the well established principle ".

.

. that persons dealing with an agent of

the United States are charged with notice of the limitation upon his authority

and the United States is bound only by the acts of an agent which are within

his authority." See Farm Security Administration, Department of Agriculture-

v. Herren, 165 F. 2d 554, 564 (C.C. A. 8th 1948), and cases there cited.
5
145 F. 2d 740 (C. C. A. 9th 1944).
6

Henderson, Administrator, O.P.A. v. Baldwin et al., 54 F. Supp. 438
(W. D. Pa. 1942). Cf. Flannagan v. United States, 145 F. 2d 740 (C. C. A.
9th 1944).
7

United States v. Alabama

Highway Express, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 450

(N. D. Ala. 1942).
8 Slack v. Glenwood Sightseeing Bus Co., 181 Misc. 988, 47 N. Y. S. 2d
876 9(City Ct. 1944).
Lavery, The Federal Register, and the Need of its Reform, 2

AND LAW Nors 1 (1948-9).
052 STAT. 77 (1938), 7
22

1944).

LAWYER

U. S. C. § 1506(e) (1946).
Felder v. Federal Crop Ins. Corporation, 146 F. 2d 638 (C. C. A. 4th
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in order to make sure whether anything has been promulgated that
affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for he would
never get time to plant any crops." 12 Considering that neither the
local agency in Idaho nor the regional office of the corporation in
Denver knew of the exclusion that rendered plaintiff's 1945 crop
uninsurable, it may well be that mere publication of these countless
'Regulations' [of Federal Administrative Agencies] is not enough to
3
call forth the doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse.1 To
Fedin
the
published
been
have
date, 100,000 of these regulations
eral Register; ". . . they are often overlapping, and sometimes con, 14
tradictory, and very often modify or repeal each other ....
Though they have been placed in bound volumes, numbering fortyseven since December, 1946, they have not been codified so as to
be as usable as the four volumes of the "United States Code" and
its supplement. The spirit of the dissent, therefore, presents an
equally strong and converse maxim or rule of law, namely, that,
"A law not properly published to the people is no law." 15

J. w. C.

PENAL

LAw -ADVERTISING

CONTESTS

CONSTITUTING

LOT-

TERIES.-The Pepsi-Cola Company of New York was engaged in an
advertising campaign in the form of "Treasure Top" contests. Contestants were required to complete the sentence, "Pepsi-Cola hits the
spot because . . . ." A bottle cap was to be submitted with each
entry. Cash prizes were to be awarded on the basis of aptness, originality and interest. Complainants are engaged in the business of
bottling, selling and distributing the soft drink known as Pepsi-Cola.
Defendants contended that the contest was a lottery and as such
against the public policy of the state as declared by the constitution
and by statute. From a decree denying a temporary injunction restraining defendants from interfering in any way with the carrying
on of the contest, complainants appeal. Held, decree reversed and
remanded, on the ground that the exercise of skill by contestants
removed it from the nature of a lottery. Minges v. City of Birmingham, - Ala. -, 36 So. 2d 93 (S. Ct. Ala. 1948).
The three necessary elements of a lottery are the offering of a
prize, the awarding thereof by chance, and the giving of a consideration for an opportunity to win the prize. All the essential elements
2
must be present to constitute the scheme a lottery. The elements
12
13

332 U. S. 380, 387, 92 L. ed. 51, 55 (1947).
Lavery, "The Federal Register"-Offlcial Publication for Administrative

Regulations, etc., 7 F. R. D. 625, 633 (1948).
14 Id. at 636.
is Id. at 634.

'ALA. CoNsT. § 65 (1901).
2 Grimes v. State, 235 Ala. 192, 178 So. 73 (1937).

